The New Russian Engagement with Latin America (PDF)

THE NEW RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN AMERICA: STRATEGIC POSITION, COMMERCE, AND DREAMS OF THE PAST R. Evan Ellis U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Carlisle Barracks, PA and UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS  The United States Army War College U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE CENTER for STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP and DEVELOPMENT The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower. The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving national security objectives. 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The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation. i   iii Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press THE NEW RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN AMERICA: STRATEGIC POSITION, COMMERCE, AND DREAMS OF THE PAST R. Evan Ellis June 2015 The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the inter- est of furthering debate on key issues. 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Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming confer- ences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter. ISBN 1-58487-687-5  v FOREWORD In recent years, attention by the U.S. national se- curity establishment to challenges in the Western Hemisphere has concentrated on issues of transna- tional organized crime, socialist populism, potential terrorist threats, and similar challenges arising from poverty, inequality, and weak governance in parts of the region. As Latin America and the Caribbean na- tions have expanded their economic and other forms of engagement with countries beyond the region, the majority of attention has gone to activities in the re- gion by the People’s Republic of China, and to a lesser extent, by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The equally important re-engagement with the region by the Rus- sian Federation during this period has received less attention, particularly among scholarly articles. Russia’s re-engagement with the region, which be- gan in earnest in 2008, coincided with an escalation in tension with the United States over the role of Russia in the civil war in Georgia and the related succession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This led Russia to de- ploy nuclear-capable backfire bombers and warships to the Caribbean, as well as initiating a wave of presi- dential level diplomacy and heightened cooperation with regimes of the Bolivarian Alliance of the Ameri- cas (ALBA). In 2014, as tensions with the United States escalated over the conflict in the Ukraine, Russia re- newed its attention to the Western Hemisphere with a new wave of diplomatic and military activity concen- trating on the relatively anti-U.S. ALBA regimes, as well as Brazil and Argentina. In both 2008 and 2014, Russia’s initiatives in Latin America and the Carib- bean seemed designed to force the United States to re- spond to a challenge in its own hemisphere, expanding  Russia’s freedom of action in its own near abroad. In the process, Russia’s actions sent an important mes- sage that U.S. security concerns in the Western Hemi- sphere are not only a function of dynamics occurring in the region itself, but also in the interconnected global security environment. Thus, U.S. decisionmak- ers responsible for Latin America and the Caribbean must also consider developments in other theaters. The present monograph by Strategic Studies In- stitute professor Dr. R. Evan Ellis is one of the first in-depth treatments of contemporary Russian engage- ment with the countries of Latin America and its sig- nificance from a national security perspective. As such, it provides important insights into both the nature of the challenge posed by Russia, as well as the evolv- ing role and persistent importance of Latin America and the Caribbean to the national security of the United States. This monograph is part of the ongoing effort by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College to provide analysis of contemporary issues impacting Latin America and the Carribbean and other regional security environments, in support of the Department of the Army, the Department of De- fense, and other U.S. decisionmakers. We hope that readers find this work both useful and intellectually stimulating. DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press vi  vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR R. EVAN ELLIS is a research professor of Latin Ameri- can Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, with a research focus on the region’s re- lationships with China and other non-Western Hemi- sphere actors. He has presented his work in a broad range of business and government forums in 25 coun- tries on four continents. He has given testimony on Latin America and Carribbean Security Issues to the U.S. Congress, and has discussed his work regarding China and other external actors in Latin America on a broad range of radio and television programs, includ- ing CNN International, CNN En Español, The John Bachelor Show, Voice of America, and Radio Marti. Dr. Ellis is cited regularly in the print media in both the United States and Latin America for his work in this area, including The Washington Times, Bloomberg, América Economía, DEF, and InfoBAE. Dr. Ellis has published over 110 works, including China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (2009), The Strate- gic Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Latin America (2013), and China on the Ground in Latin America (2014). Dr. Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics.   ix SUMMARY In many ways, Russia’s expanded engagement in Latin America as a response to escalating tension over the Ukraine was a repetition of its answer to U.S. involvement in the 2008 conflict in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. In the 2008 conflict, as the U.S. deployed naval forces to the Black Sea in response to Russian support for the breakaway republics of Ab- khazia and South Ossetia, Russia countered with a series of actions in Latin America, including sending nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, from where they conducted symbolically charged flights around the Caribbean. This was followed a month later by the deployment of a four-ship Russian naval flotilla to the area to conduct military exercises with the Venezuelan navy before making port calls in Cuba and Nicaragua. In addition to Russia’s military deployments, in November 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medve- dev traveled to Latin America to participate in the leadership summit of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, then subsequently hosted both Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in Moscow. Three months later, Boliv- ian President Evo Morales also traveled to Russia, followed in November 2009 by Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa. By comparison to the extensive literature on the activities of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemi- sphere during the Cold War, and by contrast to the rapidly growing body of works on China’s activities in the region, very little beyond journalistic accounts have been written to examine contemporary Russian activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. As  x Russia’s reassertion of its global position and associ- ated tensions with the United States proceed apace, a broad understanding of Russia in the Americas be- comes evermore important, both as a question of U.S. national security and as an important dynamic shap- ing the global geopolitical environment. This mono- graph seeks to do so, focusing on the character of the ongoing Russian re-engagement with Latin Amer- ica and the Caribbean and its implications for the United States.  1 THE NEW RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN AMERICA: STRATEGIC POSITION, COMMERCE, AND DREAMS OF THE PAST OVERVIEW In February 2015, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu traveled to Latin America to meet with leaders and defense officials in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezu- ela. The focus of meetings in all three countries was on access to ports and airfields in the region so as to support Russian military operations in the vicinity of the United States. In Nicaragua, Minister Shoigu signed an agreement to facilitate Russian access to the ports of Corinto and Bluefields, as well as strengthen- ing counterdrug cooperation and discussing weapons sales. The trip advanced discussions and reinforced the message sent by Russian President Vladimir Pu- tin when he had traveled to the region just 7 months previously, including Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina, and Brazil. As the Barack Obama administration in- creasingly pressured Russia regarding its activities in the Ukraine, Russia was equally capable of reassert- ing its presence and challenging the United States in Latin America, the region once considered the “U.S. backyard.” In many ways, Russia’s expanded engagement in Latin America as a response to escalating tension over the Ukraine was a repetition of its answer to U.S. involvement in the 2008 conflict in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. In that conflict, as the U.S. de- ployed naval forces to the Black Sea in response to Russian support for the breakaway republics of Ab- khazia and South Ossetia, Russia had countered with a series of actions in Latin America. These actions  2 included sending nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, from where they conducted symbolically charged flights around the Caribbean. This was fol- lowed a month later by the deployment of a four-ship Russian naval flotilla to the area to conduct military exercises with the Venezuelan navy before making port calls in Cuba and Nicaragua. In addition to Russia’s military deployments, in November 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medve- dev traveled to Latin America to participate in the leadership summit of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), then subsequently hosted both Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in Moscow. Three months later, Bolivian President Evo Morales also traveled to Russia, followed in November 2009 by Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa. Russia’s re-engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean has proceeded unevenly since its be- ginning in 2008. At that time, Russia concentrated on a limited number of countries, including the regimes of ALBA, as well as Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, even though it has engaged commercially, politically, and economically with other states of the region as well. With respect to economic interactions, by contrast to expanding activities in the region by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia’s economic activi- ties there have been smaller and concentrated in a more limited number of sectors, including arms sales, petroleum, electricity production, and mining. Yet, however uneven, Russia’s re-engagement with the re- gion since 2008 has produced significant cumulative results. When President Putin traveled to the region in 2014 on a four-nation tour to send a message to the United States over the conflict in the Ukraine, he was not doing so from the same low base from which his  3 predecessor, Medvedev, had begun when Medvedev launched the prior diplomatic re-engagement with the region. In another contrast to Chinese engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, Russia has not shied away from acting in a way that overtly challenged the United States. As noted earlier, the 2014 round of Rus- sian re-engagement with the region began with an announcement by Shoigu that his nation was talking with Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela about estab- lishing bases in those nations for resupplying Russian warships, and potentially for refueling Russian long range bombers. One year later, as noted previously, the Defense Minister visited the three countries to conduct talks regarding such base access. This was complimented by an announcement during the same period that Russia, for the first time, might send its aircraft on long range patrols that would reach into the Gulf of Mexico. By comparison to the extensive literature on the activities of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemi- sphere during the Cold War, and by contrast to the rapidly growing body of works on China’s activities in the region, very little beyond journalistic accounts have been written to examine contemporary Russian activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. As Rus- sia’s reassertion of its global position and associated tensions with the United States proceed apace, a broad understanding of Russia in the Americas becomes evermore important, both as a question of U.S. nation- al security and as an important dynamic shaping the global geopolitical environment. This monograph seeks to fill that gap, focusing on the character of the ongoing Russian re-engage-